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Self-organization and self-synchronization represent key capabilities for Edge organizations. However, 
roughly a century of organizations research indicates that self-organization leads often to a lack of 
complementary action, or even chaos, and that coherent self-synchronization is extremely difficult to 
achieve in organizations of the scale and complexity envisioned for Edge operations. Indeed, a major role 
of hierarchical organization—the antithesis of Edge—is to enable effective organization and coherent 
synchronization of people’s activities. However, the majority of research and thinking reflects teleological 
action in a rational-cognitive framework, in which actors plan and decide before acting. This is 
incommensurate with the kinds of fluid, rapid, dynamic and often-unpredictable mission-environmental 
contexts envisioned for Edge organizations. In contrast, the research described in this paper takes a non-
teleological, situated-action perspective to develop a basis for self-organization and –synchronization in an 
Edge organizational context. Such contrasting perspective examines how agents respond to emergent 
problems and contingencies without the benefit of clear goals or planning, and assumes that organizational 
members must act often without full awareness of consequences or articulation of purposes. Through 
extensive literature review (e.g., including pragmatic philosophy, phenomenological philosophy and 
practice theory), we show how a teleological view of action constrains the dynamics of improvisation, 
which are critical for self-organization and –synchronization, and how the corresponding identity 
construction delimits action and improvisational repertoires. We explain why a shift toward self-
organization and –synchronization at the Edge requires a non-teleological view of action, and 
corresponding approaches to organizational design and transformation: such shift marks fundamental 
identity change. The article leverages this theoretical understanding to illustrate how a Hierarchy 
organization can “move” to develop into an Edge. In particular, we articulate a set of maxims stemming 
from the theoretical integration, and then outline a three-phase approach to creating an Edge organization—
an approach that enables its emergence, and supports its growth into and effective operational resource. 
This leads to important implications and guidelines for C2 policy and practice, as well as continued 
research, associated with Edge organizations. 
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Introduction 
Research on Edge organizations proposes a radical alternative to bureaucratic organizational design 
(Alberts and Hayes 2003). Edge organizations are conceptualized to be particularly appropriate in the 
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context of modern military warfare, capitalizing upon fully connected, geographically distributed, 
organizational participants by moving knowledge and power to the edges of organizations (Nissen 2005). 
This highlights promising opportunities for enterprise efficacy, but it also raises issues in terms of 
comparative performance with respect to alternate organizational designs. Modern military organizations in 
general have adapted and evolved over many centuries and millennia, respectively. Hierarchical command 
and control (C2) organizations in particular have been refined longitudinally (e.g., through iterative combat, 
training and doctrinal development) to become very reliable and effective at the missions they were 
designed to accomplish. 
 
 Perhaps the most unique features conceptualized for Edge organizations pertain to self-
organization and self-synchronization, along with emergent leadership (Alberts and Hayes 2003). Self-
organization implies that relatively small and independent organizational units will be able to sense the 
need to come together as larger organizations with complementary capabilities specific to address a 
particular mission and environmental context—requiring often the agility to improvise and respond on the 
spot to respond to emergent, ad-hoc or ill-formed problems and contingencies without preplanning or 
hierarchical direction—and then disband into their relatively small and independent organizational units. 
This takes on many aspects of dispersed, virtual organization (e.g., see Davidow and Malone 1992), and is 
difficult to accomplish well in practice. Self-synchronization implies moreover that such relatively small 
and independent organizational units will be able to operate coherently during mission performance—
again, without preplanning or hierarchical direction—and with the agility to improvise on pre-existing 
routines to suit the unpredictable exigencies of dynamic situations. This takes on many aspects of fluid, 
highly decentralized organization (e.g., see the Adhocracy in Mintzberg 1979), and likewise is difficult to 
accomplish well in practice.  
 
Indeed, roughly a century of organizations research indicates that self-organization leads often to a 
lack of complementary action, or even chaos, and that coherent self-synchronization is extremely difficult 
to achieve in organizations of the scale and complexity envisioned for Edge operations. A major role of 
hierarchical organization—the antithesis of Edge—is to enable complementary organization and coherent 
synchronization of activities. This reinforces doubts about the feasibility of Edge organization. Although 
the Edge has been established theoretically now as a distinct organizational form (Nissen 2005, Orr and 
Nissen 2006, Nissen CMOT 2007), and demonstrated empirically to offer advantages over the Hierarchy 
and other forms (Orr and Nissen 2006, Looney and Nissen 2006, Gateau et al. 2007), applicable 
examples—much less exemplars—in practice remain elusive. References to soccer teams, open-source 
software development projects and faculty research collaborations are insightful, but they do not analogize 
directly to the military domain, and special forces units lack the kind of meritocracy and emergent 
leadership conceptualized for Edge organization. Hence a major issue pertains to how one would create, 
develop or change into an Edge organization. 
 
The majority of research and thinking to inform such issue reflects teleological action in a 
rational-cognitive framework. This implies that organizational actors plan and decide before acting. This is 
incommensurate with the kinds of fluid, rapid, dynamic and often-unpredictable mission-environmental 
contexts envisioned for Edge organizations. There is another perspective that needs to be more clearly 
understood: the situated-action perspective. A situated-action perspective assumes that organizational 
members must sometimes act without full awareness of consequences or full articulation of purposes. 
Research that focuses on the redistribution of improvisation rights would allow us to notice actors 
fabricating and inventing novel responses without a pre-scripted plan and without certainty of outcomes, 
discovering the future that their action creates as it unfolds.  
 
The research described in this paper takes a non-teleological, situated-action perspective to 
develop a basis for self-organization and –synchronization in an Edge organizational context. Such 
contrasting perspective examines how agents respond to emergent problems and contingencies without the 
benefit of clear goals or planning, and assumes that organizational members must act often without full 
awareness of consequences or articulation of purposes. We seek to understand how and under what 
conditions members of edge-like organizations can improvise and respond on the spot to ad hoc or ill 
formed problems. This approach to organizing calls for a different theory of action and identity formation. 
The situated-action framework proposes under conditions of radical uncertainty, actors rarely have time or 
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resources to analyze or create adequate predictive models of ends-oriented action. Actors are more likely to 
experiment and move quickly without the benefit of predictive rationality. This notion follows the 
Weickian dictum of doing by discovering: “How can I know how to act until I see what I do?” (Weick, 
1998). 
 
Further, the concepts of improvisation and situated action involve inevitably questions of identity. 
When people confront unexpected situations, identity questions are triggered as people wonder who they 
are and what matters. As they act and notice cues and triggers that enhance a sense of self efficacy, how do 
they frame streams of action that they then commit to? How do agents create, maintain, and transform 
identity as they respond to contingent situations? Through extensive literature review (e.g., including 
pragmatic philosophy, phenomenological philosophy and practice theory), we show how a teleological 
view of action constrains the dynamics of improvisation, which are critical for self-organization and –
synchronization, and how the corresponding identity construction delimits action and improvisational 
repertoires. We explain why a shift toward self-organization and –synchronization at the Edge requires a 
non-teleological view of action, and corresponding approaches to organizational design and transformation: 
such shift marks fundamental identity change. 
 
Identity sits at the core of human action. Where people—particularly in the Military—identify with 
hierarchical organization, centralized authority, formalized roles, relatively large and stable organizational 
units, relatively predictable missions and familiar environments, long and rigid chains of command, and 
ubiquitous, doctrinal emphasis upon rational planning before action, establishing an Edge organization does 
not appear to be feasible. Alternatively, where one can modify such identity, and alter the nature of the 
organization to reinforce edge-like activities and behavior, we propose that Edge organizations can be 
grown to reflect the kind of emergent leadership, self-organization and self-synchronization envisioned. 
The article leverages this theoretical understanding to illustrate how a Hierarchy organization can “move” 
to develop into an Edge. This leads to important implications and guidelines for C2 policy and practice, as 
well as continued research, associated with Edge organizations. 
Key Literature 
We begin by reviewing literature that addresses the nature of non-teleological action, i.e., action that is 
emergent and guided by discovery more than planning. This literature spans several fields including 
anthropology, sociology, psychology, philosophy and organizational behavior. To date, this literature has 
not been integrated, and such integration represents one contribution of this article. In particular, we review 
non-teleological approaches to action, including practice theory (especially Bourdieu and Giddens ), 
situated action theory, pragmatic philosophy (including the work of Dewey, Pearce, and Joas) and 
phenomenological philosophy (especially the work of Merleu-Ponty ).  
Purposive-rational action 
The rational actor model has become the most predominant paradigm for understanding human action. First 
gaining prominence in the field of economics, it has extended into other social science disciplines. This 
model assumes accurate information and perception, ability to notice and weigh feasible alternatives, 
clarity of goals. Rational choice theory is linked with utilitarian approaches to social action, and is 
grounded in the purposive, instrumental, calculating orientations that individuals bring to situations. The 
individual actor in this view weighs option and chooses the one that maximizes utility, engaging in what 
Weber called “purposively rational action.” This has generated several bodies of empirical research that 
highlight the subjective processes involved in predicting individual choices. This view, however, does not 
help us to notice the changing social dynamics that actors cope with as they construe and enact novel 
responses.  
 
March and Simon (1958) challenged the rational actor model of decision making; they considered 
situations that are novel, poorly defined, and for which no clear goal or no procedure exists for finding a 
solution. This “bounded rationality” perspective assumes that people have limited time, information, and 
resources, that organizational and social constraints limit the potential for fully rational solutions.  This 
model of decision making assumes that constraints create conditions of bounded rationality, that there is 
usually disagreement about goals and priorities, that decision making is political, that managers form 
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coalitions and through political processes arrive at goals and priorities; and satisfice (that is, look around 
for quick solutions in the immediate, local environment rather than searching for the optimal solution) 
rather than optimize.  
 
The bounded rationality model emphasizes habit in explaining choice making and behaviors. This 
helps to explain the persistence of behaviors and routines, but does not address the initiation of new 
behaviors. It helps to explain when and how engineering interventions are appropriate too. But because 
such bounded rationality model does not focus on the process that surrounds bounded rationality, it is not 
useful for understanding the dynamics of radical change, for understanding how people adjust to radically 
changing circumstances. Also, it is limited to individual frames of reference, and does not account for the 
process by which choices are considered and made. In rational actor and bounded rationality models, 
means-ends schemas of intentionality predominate; action is seen as the pursuit of pre-established goals or 
preferences. Perception of the world is a given and it is seen as separate from ensuing action. Actions are 
chosen from alternative scenarios. Individuals bracket, interpret, and evaluate choices. The emphasis is on 
the choice of means to attain pre-conceived goals.   
 
Our contention here is that rationality is a limited perspective in that there is a tendency to favor 
persistence and stability over change, fails to account for social phenomena involved in change; favors 
constructs like intent and performance and renders others as non-rational or irrational; tends to notice 
routine, deliberate, mechanical episodes or punctuated chapters marked off by goals and implementation; 
fails to account for novelty and unpredictability and creativity of human action.  
 
Challenging the Purposive-rational actor view: Practice theory 
 
One school that challenges the purposive-rational actor view is the area of “practice theory.”  The 
most influential theorists in this stream are Bourdieu and Giddens who point to the formative role of past 
routines and “habitus” in shaping the background of experience and how it constrains and facilitates action.  
Theorists of "practice" such as Bourdieu (1977; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992) and Giddens (1979, 1984) 
draw upon phenomenology and pragmatism to seek to explain social reproduction, routine activity, and the 
role of agency.  Bourdieu, invokes the Aristotelian idea of habitus, a "durably inculcated" assemblage of 
categories that become part of the background of lived experience.  In Bourdieu’s theory, social actors 
develop embodied, tacit, pre-conscious expectations ("intentionless intentions") that guide action. Usually 
these assumptions remain tacit background and in this sense Bourdieu’s concepts link to threads we will 
explore further below, the pragmatism of Dewey and the phenomenology of Merleu-Ponty:  "The theory of 
practical sense presents many similarities with theories, such as Dewey's, that grant a central role to the 
notion of habit, understood as an active and creative relation to the world" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 
p.122).  
 
Giddens’ structuration theory is concerned with the relationship between agency, action and 
background structures (Giddens 1979). For Giddens action and structure are recursively related.  Structure 
is created and recreated by action; action is constrained or enabled by structure.  Giddens structures are not 
apriori or independent: they are enacted, changed, modified by action.  For Giddens, interpretive schemes 
organize shared fundamental assumptions about the world; they organize the way actors construe meaning, 
understand events and experiences, serve as templates that allow individuals to process incoming 
information efficiently, to notice, select, remember, learn and extrapolate whole gestalts from partial data.  
They are the basis upon which individuals organize beliefs, values, preferences, and meanings into 
structures of knowledge.   
 
Following Giddens (1979), these shared interpretive schemas are necessary for people to live with 
a sense of ontological security, predictability, and trust.  As organization members share contexts of 
interaction, they develop common stocks of knowledge that contain deep shared assumptions in regard to 
how to act, feel, communicate, interact, negotiate meanings, and interpret situations (Giddens, 1979; 
Schutz, 1972). The background of mutual understanding and the basic orientation that members share, form 
"the core of mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sustained through and in 
processes of interaction" (Giddens, 1979, p. 83).  The accountable universe of meaning that allow actors to 
act and interpret meaningfully grants a sense of ontological security, a sense of being in a safe and 
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predictable world in which one securely knows, even though it is largely at a tacit level, what kind of 
actions and gestures are appropriate and what to  anticipate from others within the same accountable 
universe.  By embodying assumptions in regard to the carrying out of roles, the following of orders, the 
making and granting of requests, etc.  they provide stability and predictability by allowing members to 
sustain meaning and continuity within changing interactive situations.  Although interpretive repertoires are 
largely tacit and remain part of the routine background, members can often "unravel the reasons that lie 
behind their purposes and intentions" (Giddens, 1984) through categories available to them within the 
common stock of knowledge.  Routine practices allow actors to reduce complexity, lend self reflexive 
meaning to action, create "basic trust" and "ontological security." Actors routinize their practices to lend a 
sense of stability to their relationships, especially in face of the postmodern complexity and diversity 
(Giddens 1991).  
 
Thus, while they are not always consciously articulate when routines are engaged, regulation of 
routines is possible through “practical consciousness,” a phrase that resonates with Aristotle’s notion of 
practical wisdom – the tacit awareness that one is doing the right thing, in the right way, at the right time – 
actors are not dupes.  They draw upon rules and resources as they reproduce or transform the structures that 
recursively guide and constrain actions.  Various situations trigger possible interpretations of actions, a 




Closely related to the school of practice theory is situated action theory.  Theorists including 
Suchman, Lave and Wegner, Huchins propose situated action as an approach that does not focus on the 
internal cognitive state of the agent, but rather on the relationship between the subject and the situation. 
Following Conein and Jacopin (1994), “the organization of action is understood as a system emerging in 
situ from the dynamic of interactions” (p. 476). Drawing upon sociology, particularly ethnographers, 
Suchman (1987) was the first to explore situated action. Suchman noticed that the way subjects carry out 
tasks in laboratories is very different from the way they do so in situ.  
 
Recall that the purposive – rational view of intentional action assumes that the agent uses sense 
data to assess the current state and deductively creates a formal plan that changes the current state into the 
intended state. The plan symbolically constructed before action and is executed until the goal is achieved. 
The emphasis is on the agent’s ability to build an abstract model of the world in his / her head. The theories 
we have been exploring address the question that purposive action theory does not – that is, how do we 
account for ongoing, habitual activity? This theory fails to explain how subjects act in situations in which 
they are thrown embodied, when there is no time for deliberative reflections.  
 
In situation theory, the environment plays an active role and in this sense is consistent with 
Bourdieu and Gidden’s theory of structuration. The agent responds to details in the environment and the 
environment changes as the agent acts. Situated action is “the view that every course of action depends in 
essential ways upon its material and social circumstances. Rather than attempting to abstract action away 
from its circumstances and represent it as a rational plan, the approach is to study how people use their 
circumstances to achieve intelligent action” (Suchman, 1987, p. 50). The plan does have a function: it is 
used a resource used as an orienting device or serves as a retrospective account after the action is 
accomplished. Action emerges from the situation at hand. Like the indexicality of language, action assumes 
meaning through circumstances, through dynamic interaction with others systems of words and deeds as 
situations arise.  Situated action theory is concerned with investigating” how people produce and find 
evidence for plans in the course of situated action.” Suchman (1987) gives an example of going over the 
falls in a canoe: 
 
in planning to run a series of rapids in a canoe, one is very likely to sit for a while above the falls and 
plan one's decent. The plan might go something like "I'll get as far over to the left as possible, try to 
make it between those two large rocks, then backferry hard to the right to make it around that next 
bunch." A great deal of deliberation, discussion, simulation, and reconstruction may go into such a 
plan. But, however detailed, the plan stops short of the actual business of getting your canoe through 
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the falls. When it really comes down to the details of responding to currents and handling a canoe, 
you effectively abandon the plan and fall back on whatever embodied skills are available to you. 
 
People construct their plans as they go along, like bricoleurs, altering their moves as they go forward, 
discovering action possibilities as they proceed.  Suchman (1987) states that "we generally do not anticipate 
alternative courses of action, or their consequences, until some course of action is already under way." 
 
Pragmatic theories of action  
 
Perhaps the most explicit criticism of the shortcomings of purposive-rational action comes from the 
pragmatists – including Dewey, Mead, and more recently, Joas.  Joas (1992) highlights the shortcomings of 
teleological views of action and how traditionally action is seen as purposive, having prior goals; cognition 
is divorced from action; assumes the actor’s capacity to exercise rational control over his / her body; views 
humans as autonomous agents. Pragmatist theorists focus on the situation rather than the internal cognitive 
choices of the actor. Actions are not conceived as following predetermined goals; rather “ends in view” 
emerge out of situations, from judgments and assumptions about the dynamic situation. Non-teleological 
view of action tends to notice how situations are bracketed, interpreted, and defined in relation to capacities 
for action. From this perspective, actors test out and revise courses of action as each “end-in-view” 
becomes a possible trigger for further “ends in view.” Means and ends are not separable, but intermingled. 
Goal setting does occur, but is often result of breakdown or is retrospective label applied after action.  
 
Joas (1992) contends that purposive-rational view of action tends to downplay creative action and 
improvisation. How does the pragmatist paradigm challenge the teleological view of intentionality, the 
purposive, utilitarian control of the body, individual autonomy? Intention is continually emergent in a 
dynamic process of means, ends, and context (framework, situation, background circumstances or 
framework); the body is not only an instrumental means to accomplish goals, but rather is a “source” of 
impulses to action, and finally, identity emerges through the process of social interaction. This pragmatist 
view involves an appreciation of the role of social dynamics and group dynamics in shaping self-identity; 
an appreciation of corporeality – the body’s capabilities, habits, and ways of relating to situation and form 
the background that allow “ends-in-view” to emerge; the key role of the situation. Conscious goal-setting 
does occur, but it is the result of a breakdown in situation in which the actor can no longer continue to pre-
reflectively pursue forms of action. Often, goal setting emerges when reflection is triggered within 
situations in which one has been acting on a pre-reflective level. Motives, goals, and plans are the products 
of these situations in which reflection must be engaged.  
 
The pragmatic view highlights the temporal dimension of meaning construction. These theories 
help us to notice how individuals imagine new projects when taken for granted background routines are 
disrupted and no longer sufficient to resolve emerging dilemmas. Dewey explores the role of future time 
perspective in these moments: “Experience in its vital form is experimental, an effort to change the given; it 
is characterized by projection, by reaching forward into the unknown; connection with the future is its 
salient trait” (Dewey, 1981, p 61). Human intelligence, he contends, is concerned with the ability to “read 
future results in present on-goings” (Dewey, 1981, p 69).  
 
Purposive rational and normative theories of action privilege the individual as autonomous agent 
while pragmatist views of action highlight the social relationships and dynamics, how identity emerges 
within the configuration and ensemble of social relations and exchanges.  Rational-purposive and 
normative views of action see the body as being under the instrumental control of the mind. However, the 
body can be the source of feelings and incitements to action; a pragmatist approach includes notions of 
emotion, intuition, vague and inarticulate nascent impulses, contextual awareness of the body’s 
arrangement, moving through space. These impulses can become intention, but do not begin in such a form.  
Phenomenological approach: Merleau-Ponty and corporeality  
 
Heidegger also challenged the Cartesian approach that assumes an internal rational agent separate from the 
objective world (Heidegger, 1929). Heidegger abandons the notion of knowledge as internal 
representations within the mind; the focus is “being-in-the-world,” the pre reflective activity in which we 
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find ourselves absorbed. The context, the referential totality precedes awareness of any isolated object. 
Rather than seeing humans as primarily goal-setting agents, for Heidegger absorbed coping is the primary 
way of “being in the world: reflection and deliberation occur only after there is a breakdown of absorbed 
coping. As one becomes competent, techniques, rules, explicit skills become background familiarity. 
Heidegger wants to do away with this notion of the human mind as made up of rules or programs. The 
basic level of being for Heidegger is non reflective, absorbed engagement and routine action; so a fighter 
pilot engaged in flying a sortie is not consciously following rules; it is not consciousness that matters for 
Heidegger, it is skillful activity in which consciousness of rules withdraws and becomes background 
material. One cannot separate agent from world; person exists in holistic relation to the totality of 
equipment and becomes conscious of separate tools only when there is a breakdown (“unready to hand” 
mode).  
 
Merleau Ponty (1962) built upon Heidegger’s ontology; perception for Merleau Ponty is not a 
matter of passive, ocular reception of sense data, but involves the entire “body schema.” He addresses the 
question of how we come to have a stable grip on the world. What are perceived as stable objects are 
composed by one’s bodily response. When Merleau-Ponty writes “I am my body,” he objects to the 
traditional notion that the mind is passive sensory receptor of things in the world. Like his mentor 
Heidegger, he argues against the Cartesian dualism that plots mind as separate and distinct from body. The 
body is not just an object for the reflection of mind or a tool to respond to the mind’s direction. 
Embodiment is constitutive of perception and cognition. For him, the perceiving mind is the body 
incarnated. Embodiment in the world, the body-subject as perception, reconstructs things intentionally 
through pre-reflective understanding of world. It is through the body that we have access to the world. 
Body is a condition of experience, part of the perpetual openness to the world: “Insofar as I have hands, 
feet; a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not dependent on my decisions and which affect my 
surroundings in a way that I do not choose” (1962, p. 440).  Objects we perceive in the world are always of 
a certain kind and in relation to some human intention. Perception in this sense is “creative receptivity.”  
 
How does perception come to constitute the body’s involvement in the world?  Through skills and 
habits. We experience the world through the “I can,” an orientation towards projects and aspects of the 
world based on our capacity. This is an important insight for social researchers:  the way things in the 
world show up to us is partially dependent on our skills and habits. The body seeks stability through skillful 
coping, what he calls “habituality.” The aspects of an object revealed to a body-subject are dependent upon 
their bodily position and upon the individual’s degree of skillful coping.  
 
As an example of the way the subject-body develops intelligence and skill and objects in the world 
“show up” in particular ways, he cites examples from sports.  
 
For the player in action the football field is not an 'object', that is, the ideal term which can give 
rise to a multiplicity of perspectival views and remain equivalent under its apparent 
transformations. It is pervaded with lines of force (the 'yard lines'; those which demarcate the 
penalty area) and articulated in sectors (for example, the 'openings' between the adversaries) which 
call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action as if the player were 
unaware of it. The field itself is not given to him, but present as the immanent term of his practical 
intentions; the player becomes one with it and feels the direction of the goal, for example just as 
immediately as the vertical and horizontal planes of his own body" (SB 168). 
 
In this example, perception does not involve a detached, cognitive reflection or a move of interpretation 
separate from activity, does not require a subject who is aware of pitching the football. This hints at the 
form of interaction that Merleau-Ponty feels informs most of our everyday activity. As we become more 
skillful in a variety of scenarios, the world shows up in a way that draws upon those skills.  In contrast to 
the predominance of rational ego or the thinking “I” seeking pleasure or motivation, or reflecting on action, 
for Merleau-Ponty, the body tries to form an intentional arc. As he puts it, "the body will draw to itself the 
intentional threads which bind it to its surroundings and finally will reveal to us the perceiving subject as 
the perceived world" (1962, p. 453). In other words, as embodied agents our successful encounters and 
mastery of execution of tasks continually augments, cultivates, and enhances how objects and situations 




Our perceptions and actions then guide us to seek a “maximal grip,” are habitual and make sense 
as responses within the context of a particular community. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty is particularly 
applicable for understanding the shift from bureaucracy to edge because he is ultimately concerned with the 
act of learning and how it is that people notice the appropriate thing to do. He criticizes the traditions of 
empiricism and intellectualism because “neither can grasp consciousness in the act of learning, and that 
neither attaches due importance to that circumscribed ignorance, that still empty but always determinate 
intention which is attention itself" (1962, p. 28). As we develop sets of embodied sills, we encounter more 
situations that call upon us to act, draw us into reacting to certain situations, enables our successful coping 
in ways that do not demand reflective goal oriented thought. Dreyfus calls this “embodied solicitations to 
act.” How does a person transition from “command and control” situation to an edge like situation? In edge 
organizations an agent sees the appropriate thing to do in a way that is nuanced differently than if he / she 
were in a bureaucratic situation. Seeing the appropriate thing to do involves responding without 
deliberation and does not assume knowledge that can be conceptually articulated.  
 
What does it mean to propose that we learn skills not from reflection and purposive thought, but 
through repeated embodied attempts? The body in this sense develops an intelligence. This is the way in 
which understanding the process of learning does not require a theory of passive perception or 
interpretation. Learning habits "is knowledge in the hands, which is forthcoming only when bodily effort is 
made, and cannot be formulated in detachment from that effort" (1962, p.144). Mastery allows us to 
perform an action without conscious reflection and yet still said to constitute embodied intelligence. The 
body renders phenomena intelligible. We see opportunities for action based upon the build up of embodied 
experiences. Our skilful embodiment makes it possible for us to encounter "more and more differentiated 
solicitations to act", and enables us to react to situations, in ways that have previously proved successful, 
and which do not require purposive thought. 
 
We said earlier that it is the body which "understands" in the acquisition of habituality. This way 
of putting it will appear absurd, if understanding is subsuming a sense datum under an idea, and if 
the body is an object. But the phenomenon of habituality is just what prompts us to revise our 
notion of "understand" and our notion of the body. To understand is to experience harmony 
between what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance - and the 
body is our anchorage in the world (1962, p. 144).  
This is the intentional arc -- knowledge and understanding in “harmony” between what we intend and what 
we do. Knowledge and consciousness are primarily not a matter of "I think that", but of "I can" (1962, p. 
137). Action here is seen as spontaneous and practical, and not to be understood as part of a mind-body 
distinction (PP 145). Most of the time, we act spontaneously and pre-reflectively in accord with embodied 
skill.  
Learning as embodied skill acquisition 
From this perspective, how does one learn and how does one acquire skills? Merleau Ponty articulates how 
expertise acquired second nature. Dreyfus draws upon Merleau Ponty to posit a skill learning model that 
demonstrates how and why affordances show up for novices and competent performers differently than 
they do for experts. As beginners we consciously follow rules; however these rules become like training 
wheels and we set them aside. To become an expert, one switches from a detached reflection of rules to a 
more involved and specific way of coping. Dreyfus cites a study of student nurses who remain detached 
and follow rules but never progress beyond competence; those who become emotionally involved and take 
their successes and failures to hear develop into experts (Benner, P. 1996).  If something goes amiss, then 
one is less likely to develop expertise if the instinct is to assume a disinterested involvement and devise 
intricate rules to guard against future mistakes; expertise is more likely to develop if one stays involved and 
feels the impact of successes and failures. Emotional involvement might be necessary to evolve from a 
detached beginner to an involved and engaged holistic experience (Dreyfus, 2005 APA address).  Enhanced 
involvement sharpens perceptual ability to notice nuances.  When chess Grandmaster plays lightning chess 
at world class level, there is little reflection or deliberation involved; the Grandmaster is simply responding 
to the situation on the board. There is no time for analysis of alternatives.  Therefore, as one develops 
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expertise after much absorbed experience, deliberative reasons based on rules do not help much. They 
operate as “second nature,” the basis upon which skilled coping takes place. This is why sometimes experts 
have trouble giving reasons for their actions: they have none other than retrospective rationalization. This is 
a long way of saying that a person will not become an expert at operating within edge organizations by 
listening to lessons or following rules of previous experts. 
  
Following Dreyfus, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, embodied actors respond to affordances. 
Affordance is a term coined by Kurt Lewin, meaning that the perceived object is associated with some 
signification for action; the object is significant because it is linked to perceptual experience, including 
traces from previous experiences. As the object affords, or shows up in a certain way, it invites certain 
responses or actions. Thus food affords eating, doors afford opening and closing, etc.  Again, this 
responsive perception is not necessarily conscious.  Following Taylor, even though we respond to 
affordances, it does not necessarily mean that we notice them:  
 
As I navigate my way along the path up the hill, my mind totally absorbed in anticipating the 
difficult conversation I’m going to have at my destination, I treat the different features of the 
terrain as obstacles, sports, openings, invitations to treat more warily, or run freely and so on. 
Even when I’m not thinking of them these things have those relevancies for me (Taylor, 2005). 
 
Affordances solicit us to act so that we are able to cope competently without thinking.  
 
Dreyfus draws upon Merleu Ponty to develop a model of skill acquisition that does not rely on a 
rationalistic notion of plans as internal representations, in particular his notion of intentional arc, the “tight 
connection between the agent and the world viz. that, as the agent acquires skills, these skills are stored not 
as representations in the mind, but as more and more refined dispositions to respond to the solicitations 
(italics added) of more and more refined perceptions of the current situation.”  Skill acquisition occurs as 
the body seeks “maximum grip,” the capacity to respond to solicitations in ways that bring the current 
situation into a gestalt sense of wholeness. Dreyfus’ model of skill acquisition outlines how this intentional 
arc is achieved.  
 
To summarize the points above, for Merleu Ponty, skills are acquired as ways of dealing with 
situations; these situations then show up for us in ways that afford our skillful response. How is our relation 
to the world transformed as we acquire a skill?  As the following stage model shows, following context-
free rules will not lead to competent performance as the beginner meets unforeseen obstacles. The learner 
needs to understand not only the rules and the facts, but also needs to understand context.  
 
Stage 1: novice. The novice learns first through instruction that deconstructs the task into context-free rules. 
Beginning drivers learn the techniques of shifting gears, learn to attend to the speedometer, how to break at 
red lights, etc.  
 
Stage 2: Advanced beginner. As the beginner improves in his capacity to cope with driving situations, he 
begins to notice additional aspects of the dimensions and conditions. The instructor might provide maxims 
to help cope with these aspects that the inexperienced novice might notice. The beginning driver learns to 
notice the sound of the engine, and the maxim – when the engine sounds like it is working too hard, shift 
up. With experience, the beginner notices lists of such features, aspects he could not have without some 
experience of the contexts to which a maxim might apply. The learning at this stage is still likely the 
detached, analytical mind applying rules and maxims, follows instructions that apply to particular 
examples.  
 
Stage 3: Competence. To become a competent performer, a deeper level of involvement is called for. With 
increasing experience more and more aspects become salient, the learner may be overcome with the 
plethora of facts. To become competent, people learn to devise a plan, to choose a point of view, that 
focuses upon certain aspects and ignores others. As the number of features and potential signs are restricted 
choice is made easier. These are more complicated than the rules or maxims that beginners relied upon 
from manuals. There are now an overwhelming number of possible situations and features that one can 
look for. The competent performer chooses one perspective but not skilled enough to know if this is the 
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best or correct choice. Coping at this point raises anxiety because the number of options is large. As our 
driver become competent and seeks to make a left hand turn as someone is crossing the street, he learns to 
attend to the speed of the car without having to consciously shift gears, or if he hits a patch of ice, for 
instance. The competent learner has experiences ranging from fright to elation (depending on whether he is 
successful or not) partially because he is aware that he is responsible for choosing the plan for action that 
will account for the necessarily limited number of features in the challenging situation. At this point, the 
learner is emotionally invested in the choices of action. Affective involvement, according to Dreyfus, plays 
a role in widening the number of perspectives and developing a holistic background of awareness. 
 
Stage 4:  Proficiency. Proficiency emerges when the detached, object rule following of the beginner is 
replaced by involved absorption of activity. Emotional responses will heighten awareness of successful 
responses and handicap unsuccessful choices. The learner develops situational discernment and an 
awareness of differentiated and refined nuances that call for more finessed, finely tuned and precise 
responses. The proficient learner spontaneously sees relevant features of the situation; yet he / she still must 
decide what to do. The proficient driver is in a snowstorm, intuitively feels that he should brake very 
slowly and must decide when and how to apply brakes. The proficient driver is able to successfully 
negotiate the stop better than the competent driver who is monitoring speedometer, speed of other cars, etc. 
The proficient learner recognizes a large repertoire of possible actions and must determine consciously how 
to move.  
 
Stage 5: Expertise. While the proficient performer notices many nuances, he must decide how to act. The 
expert has a vast repertoire of discernment and sees immediately how to respond. There is no deliberation 
or conscious choice making. The expert has had the experience of more refined and discriminant nuances. 
Having had a variety of experiences, the expert has learned which action is appropriate and affords an 
intuitive situational response. Hence experts do not achieve expertise by accumulating representations 
inside the mind; rather they are thrown into situations that are more refined discriminations, situations that 
show up and solicit an appropriate response. This is what Merleu-Ponty meant by the intentional arc. The 
subject is not a passive recipient of sense impressions; rather the situation already shows up from some 
perspective and affords and solicits certain repertoire of actions.  
 Practical Illustration 
In this section we illustrate practical application of the theoretical revelations elucidated above. We focus 
on the military domain, and concentrate in particular on the Global War on Terror (GWOT), a seemingly 
enduring endeavor that appears to call for more edge-like behavior (Nissen 2005b, Gateau et al. 2007). We 
begin by summarizing a set of maxims stemming from the theoretical integration above, and follow with a 
three-phase approach to Edge organization. 
Maxims 
A practical contrast emerges directly from the discussion above. The teleological, rational-actor perspective 
emphasizes rational planning and what people know. Based on the rational actor model, people are taught 
rules and trained to the level of novices, under the assumption that performing competently in edge 
situations is a matter of mastering acontextual rules.  This learning takes place within the Hierarchy 
organization at present, which sets the conditions and prescribes the activities that reinforce the identities of 
people working within a hierarchy. Hence what is learned is a set of skills appropriate for operating within 
a hierarchy. Following theories of phenomenology and skill acquisition, the organizational world – 
situations that call for appropriate action – show up in ways that accommodate these skills.  In other words, 
competent actors notice nuances and situations that are consistent with their identities as skillful copers 
within hierarchies and are likely to not notice other situations or opportunities for action for which they 
lack facility.   
 
Maxim 1. The doing, learning and on-the-job experience required to develop edge-like behaviors must take 
place in an environment that encourages and reinforces such edge-like behaviors. 
 





The situated-action perspective emphasizes improvisation.  People are encouraged to take risks and 
experiment with different approaches to problems. This implies that agents must be “thrown in” to edge 
like situations that require novel responses.  Actors are likely not to feel comfortable, knowledgeable or 
competent as confusing scenarios and unfamiliar actions throw them back into relying upon sets of rules.  
Therefore, in the earliest stages, it is best to devise sets of fundamental edge-like rules to guide novice 
behavior.  The irony of course is that hierarchies are explicit rule-based contexts and care must be taken to 
not allow actors to over rely on rules or assume that rules are a permanent fixture.  Or perhaps more 
importantly, these rules should be obviously temporary aids which themselves should be disrupted so that 
learners do not assume that learning acontextual rules is adequate to attain competence in edge-like 
settings.  
 
Maxim 2. The Edge organization can emerge from the activities, dialogs and interactions of people 
working together in an environment that encourages and reinforces edge-like behaviors. 
 
The key implication: an Edge organization can be grown only through conditions that promote edge-
like behaviors. 
 
 Not all people are likely to be equally comfortable with or effective in an environment that 
encourages and reinforces edge-like behaviors. Likewise, not all people are likely to be equally comfortable 
with or effective in bureaucratic hierarchies. This stems in part from our qualitative work as well. Some 
people have developed competent skills to achieve a maximum grip within edge-like environments—and 
hence would have a better chance of interacting in a way that leads to the emergence of Edge 
organization—than others are. In terms of identity, some people’s identities correspond more closely with 
those appropriate to Edge organization—and hence would have a better chance of earlier adoption of an 
edge like activities. Background competence and experience in fluid environments will play a factor as 
some will have developed a level of skill that allows them to notice opportunities to act.   
 
Maxim 3. The people working together in an environment that encourages and reinforces edge-like 
behaviors must learn the kinds of activities, dialogs and interactions required for Edge organization. 
 
The key implication: since an Edge organization can be grown only by people who identify with edge-
like behaviors, in order to transition to edge-like structures it is important leaders design systems 
and opportunities for learning competencies in fluid, edge-like environments.  Below we suggest 
phases of development that designers might keep in mind as they seek to support edge behaviors.   
Three-Phase approach to Edge organization 
Integrating and building upon the three maxims and implications above, it follows that one must be willing 
and able to isolate appropriate people in non-hierarchical environments, and allow them time and 
opportunity to interact under conditions that promote trusting interrelationships, improvisation, and 
ultimately emergent edge-like behaviors. This leads to three, critical and practical questions that must be 
answered: 1) which people? 2) which conditions? and 3) which activities? Drawing in part from the 
diagnosis of organizational misfits and development of a transformation approach to address the GWOT 
challenge (see Nissen 2005b), the three-phase approach outlined here addresses these questions, and 
provides the leader or manager with an actionable plan to growing an Edge organization. 
 
Phase 1 – From Novice to Competent. Reiterating from above for reference, the novice learns first 
through instruction that deconstructs the task into rules. Participants will need to be instructed on how they 
are expected to behave in edge-like environments, and they will need to practice adhering to the 
corresponding “rules” for behaving in such environments. However, these rules are offered as ironic 
contingencies, since developing competency and expertise involves abandoning rules.  
 
The first step requires selecting people who are suitable for an edge-like environment, isolating a 
critical mass of them together—in a non-hierarchical context that will encourage and reinforce edge-like 
behaviors—and setting up the kinds of conditions and activities that will promote edge learning. Remember 
Maxim 1: The doing, learning and on-the-job experience required to develop edge-like behaviors must take 
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place in an environment that encourages and reinforces such edge-like behaviors. Someone from outside 
this environment will need to think carefully about setting up and staffing such environment. Moreover, 
following the expertise-development progression outlined above, people will need to develop some means 
to bring new participants up to Novice level relatively quickly. The suggestions in this Phase-1 description 
should be helpful in this regard, and could be used in conjunction with others such as training materials to 
sensitize participants to the kinds of behaviors deemed “edge-like” and hence encouraged. 
 
Although substantial additional research will be required to develop clear specifications for what 
criteria to use for selecting such people, the Military possesses and uses many batteries of tests and profiles 
today to assess its personnel on the basis of leadership, independence, confidence, and other factors that 
may serve as proxies. These can provide a first sort through potentially appropriate personnel. Additionally, 
clearly there is ample opportunity to learn from experience that can be gained from experimenting with 
people reflecting different characteristics, and observing how well they perform in an edge-like 
environment. Indeed, setting up the environment and growing an Edge organization should not be thought 
of in teleological terms (e.g,. deliberate planning followed by execution). Rather, people responsible for 
setting up the edge-conducive environment will be required to improvise and learn from experience in 
many of the same ways that participants in the isolated environment will. Moreover, given that we do not 
have great knowledge about the kinds of people who will make effective Edge organization participants 
yet, it will be highly appropriate to incentivize people to self-select into and out of such environment; the 
people themselves are likely to be the best judges of their relative fit into and appropriateness for Edge 
organization. 
 
 This first step also requires establishing a set of conditions that will encourage and reinforce edge-
like behaviors. Our theoretical understanding of the Edge organization can be useful to inform us in this 
regard. Fundamentally, there can be no explicit rank structure in such environment: in order for a 
meritocracy to develop, people must interact with one another on the basis of knowledge and expertise, not 
rank. Fortunately, people of higher rank tend in many cases to be more knowledgeable and experienced in 
certain domains, but in others—particularly those requiring narrow or quickly changing technical skills—
the situation is inverted: those freshly out of college, with a current technical certification, or who 
completed a graduate-education program recently may have the most applicable knowledge and expertise 
for a particular task at hand. These are the ones who need to be encouraged to lead (and rewarded, or at 
least not punished, for leading)—during the time in which such knowledge and expertise are relevant—
regardless of rank. As a somewhat gentle transition, participants in this environment could be encouraged 
to elect a leader for a given set of activities, and such leader would be authorized (encouraged and rewarded 
would be better) thereby to give direct orders to others. However, once such set of activities had been 
completed, the elected leader’s charter would expire, and people would be encouraged to elect other leaders 
(depending upon knowledge and expertise required) for each subsequent set of activities. 
 
 Additionally, task activities must be set up in a manner that requires considerable dialogue and 
coordination between people. Over time, and as people develop novice-levels skills in edge-like 
environments, reciprocal interdependence among tasks should become increasingly high and pervasive, so 
that people will be required to work together as teams. Activities will need to be set up to compel the 
formation of teams, and multiple teams should be encouraged to devise alternate approaches to 
accomplishing the same tasks. From a rational-actor perspective, “assigning” multiple teams as such would 
clearly be viewed as “redundant,” but in the context of developing edge-like behaviors, people will need to 
learn how to pursue multiple, simultaneous approaches, and how to conduct dialog and debate to decide 
among multiple, competing alternatives. Hence there should be more than just one “best way” to 
accomplish the activities that are selected for this environment, and such activities should be inherently 
complex and ambiguous enough to require substantial and sustained interaction among teammates. The 
incentive system should encourage individual teams to compete against one another when exploring 
alaternatives, but at the same time, it must reward the organization as a whole for coming together as a 
coherent unit—collection of units actually—to undertake whichever competing approach is selected by the 
participants; that is, unlike deliberate planning and hierarchical decision making in the Military today, in 
which teams of staff personnel work to develop and present alternate courses of action to decision-making 
commanders (i.e., hierarchy behaviors), edge-like behavior will encourage competing teams to decide 




 Finally, the conditions and activities should be set up to allow participants to learn and practice the 
kinds of edge-like skills and behaviors included at the Novice level. For instance, where participants are 
encouraged to elect leaders for different situations and activities, they will be reverting to direct supervision 
as a coordination mechanism, which is not the preferred edge-like mode of mutual adjustment. Here, the 
skill to be learned focuses on electing different leaders for different activities and situations, and then 
electing other leaders when such activities and situations pass. The behaviors to be practice center on 
different people emerging to lead on short notice and based upon skill and expertise, and them falling back 
into the pool of participants once the activities and situations pass. The activities selected for the 
organization to practice with should be sufficiently independent and clear to enable direct supervision to 
succeed as a coordination mechanism. For instance, direct supervision from a single leader will break down 
very quickly when the leader is forced to coordinate single handedly myriad different conversations, 
decisions and actions. The key is for the people to succeed and benefit from positive reinforcement of the 
skills and behaviors being learned. Returning to our driving metaphor, they must learn to start and stop the 
car safely at low speeds and in the absence of traffic before being tossed onto a busy freeway interchange at 
rush hour. Returning to our expertise-development progression from above, they must master the Novice 
skills before progressing to the next levels. 
 
Phase 2 – From Competence to Expertise Development. The second step requires progressing through 
the Advanced beginner (e.g., noticing additional aspects), Competence (e.g., deeper level of involvement), 
Proficient (e.g., involved absorption of activity) and finally Expertise (e.g., intuitive situational response) 
stages. The experienced professional will think immediately to the myriad, common, expertise-
development programs (e.g., to train pilots, surgeons, lawyers, other professionals) that serve well to guide 
people through professional development across many diverse fields. It is important to note that most such 
programs focus on individuals, however, whereas the focus here is upon communities of people working 
together to grow Edge organizations. In this respect, the most appropriate comparator is the kind of unit- or 
group-level training that takes place before most military deployments, augmented by the subsequent unit- 
and group-level experience gained on the job and in theater. The leader or manager should look to these, 
long-established and well-refined approaches when thinking about growing Edge organizations. It is critical 
to reiterate, however, that growing Edge organizations cannot take place within the hierarchical 
organizations responsible for such training and experience today. 
  
In this second stage, the people who appear to be mapping their identities well toward the kinds 
required for effective edge-like behaviors should be rewarded and encouraged to remain in the isolated 
edge-like environment, whereas those not fitting the identity profile well should be encouraged to leave. 
Remember Maxim 2: The Edge organization must be grown from the activities, dialogs and interactions of 
people working together in an environment that encourages and reinforces edge-like behaviors. Remember 
Maxim 3 also: The people working together in an environment that encourages and reinforces edge-like 
behaviors must be suited well for the kinds of activities, dialogs and interactions required for Edge 
organization. Hence attention to the participants in the isolated edge-like environment will be critical. Just 
as fine wine is unlikely to emerge from bad grapes, an Edge organization is unlikely to emerge from people 
who cannot identify well and participate coherently. 
 
 The conditions and activities will need to be adjusted to push people beyond the Novice level. 
They should be encouraged, for instance, to dispense with formal elections of leaders, and to progress more 
toward the fluid emergence and submergence of leaders as necessary. This is similar to the manner in 
which participants is jazz bands take turns leading versus “comping” (i.e., accompanying) at various, often 
unpredictable but noticeable times with coherent action, or soccer players take turns dribbling the ball and 
taking shots on goal versus passing to and assisting others; well-adjusted soccer players do not care 
whether they are the ones who score goals, so long as someone on the team scores. The complexity and 
ambiguity of activities must increase to the point where direct supervision will suffice no longer as a 
coordination mechanism (e.g., where leaders exceed their bounded rationalities and become overloaded by 
information), and tasks must become sufficiently interdependent so that decomposition is effective no 
longer (e.g., where tasks become reciprocally interdependent and require mutual adjustment by those 
performing them). Here the rules learned as Novice will continue to apply but become insufficient for 
success, and people—working together in teams and as a whole organization—will require improvisation, 
 13
 14
experimentation and practice to develop the appropriate routines. Moreover, they will require the ability to 
learn how to learn new routines, how to form into new organizational configurations, and how to 
coordinate new sets of activities. 
 
 Participants will need to learn to trust one another, and to merit one another’s trust. They will need 
to learn how to debate and dialog regarding alternate approaches, and how to use persuasion as opposed to 
orders to make decisions, enlist volunteers, and effect actions. They will need to learn how to assemble 
parallel organizational units to explore alternate approaches, and how to reassemble them into coherent 
organizational wholes when the times for execution and improvisation come. They will need to learn the art 
and practice of persistent, multiparty conversations, and to tolerate substantial ambiguity, as important 
questions remain unanswered for extended periods of time. They will need to learn how edge-like 
behaviors can lead ultimately to better decisions and actions, and how the skills and expertise they 
accumulated through work in hierarchies fail to apply well in the edge-like environment. Their activities 
should become progressively more challenging, with conditions that favor progressively more edge-like 
behaviors for success.  
 
People should be encouraged further to suspend their activities periodically, to reflect upon and 
learn from them. Participants will need to focus extensively on learning, and they will need to learn how to 
learn in an edge-like environment. Ironically, this may require a teleological approach involving deliberate 
planning followed by rational action. Unlike the kind of action-oriented teleological approach derided 
above as being improvisation-inhibiting, however, the teleological approach considered here is learning-
oriented. Participants will reflect upon and discuss improvisational actions, plan how to learn from such 
improvisations, and attempt to incorporate such learning into future improvisations. Moreover, participants 
will learn to work together in diverse and shifting groups, but as a whole and coherent organization. As 
they are learning to work together in an edge-like environment, they will be growing such environment and 
causing it to emerge. This is a classic instantiation of structuration as discussed above; that is, by learning 
how to work together coherently in an edge-like environment, they will be creating such edge-like 
environment, and through extended conversations, dialogs and interactions, they will be causing this 
environment to emerge and grow. Phase 2 ends when the organization as a whole reaches the Expertise 
level. An organization that fails to reach this level should be considered a failed experiment and 
disbanded—followed immediately by another experiment using a different set of people, conditions and 
activities. Patience will be critical: by metaphor, one does not obtain a beautiful rose garden from the first 
seed set into the ground. 
 
Phase 3 – Application to operational missions. Finally, when an organization as a whole reaches the 
Expertise level, demonstrating edge-like behaviors (esp. emergent leadership, self-organization and self-
synchronization), it is ready for operational missions. The organization as a whole needs to be 
transplanted—with as much of its isolated, edge-encouraging environment as possible—into the 
geopolitical/theater/tactical context required for mission execution, and it needs to be left alone. The first 
hint of direct supervision from a Hierarchy offers excellent potential to cause the Edge organization to 
devolve quickly into a part of the hierarchy, and hence losing all of the relative advantages inherent in this 
alternate organizational form. Leaders and policy makers should be very careful here. There is little sense 
in growing Edge organizations only to kill them within hierarchies.  
 
Leaders and policy makers will need to be patient too. The Edge organization may not succeed 
immediately. Indeed, it may not perform as well initially as conventional, hierarchical counterparts do. 
However, its power lies in its agility and its ability to learn, grow and change. Given time and support, the 
Edge is likely to outperform its conventional, hierarchical counterparts on missions that are appropriate for 
Edge organizations. This latter point is key. All of our theoretical and empirical research indicates 
consistently that the “best” organizational form is contingent upon the specific mission-environmental 
context. Placing an Edge organization in a mission-environmental context for which conventional, 
hierarchical organizations are suited well makes no sense (e.g., consider the Cold War context). Neither 
does it make sense to place conventional, hierarchical organizations in mission-environmental contexts for 




Finally, leaders and policy makers will need to manage the expectations and jealousies of people 
in both Edge and Hierarchy organizations. Promotions, rewards, incentives must be commensurate with 
value in both kinds of organizations, and although Edge organizations may be placed in situations where 
they compete with Hierarchy organizations on the same missions—clearly competition here pertains to 
pursing alternate courses of action—perhaps engendering resentment in one organization or another, 
leaders and policy makers will need to redouble efforts to ensure that both kinds of organizations—albeit 
very different from one another—remain always on the same side and pursue the same national and 
military goals. Leaders and policy makers will need to manage their own expectations and jealousies as 
well. Indeed, such expectations and jealousies may represent the single greatest threat to Edge organization 
emergence and growth. Particularly in the Military, which offers few avenues for lateral entry, leaders have 
invested decades of service—entire careers—in support and leadership of Hierarchy organizations; they are 
committed generally to such hierarchical organizations, and they have much to lose if the Hierarchy 
becomes recognized as an inferior organizational form for GWOT. If a leader or policy maker wishes to 
kill an Edge organization, then all that is required is to bring it into the Hierarchy. Alternatively, if the wish 
is for an Edge organization to emerge, grow and flourish, then it must be left alone. 
 
 Clearly many details remain unresolved through this research to date. However, building upon a 
growing and coherent body of theory and empirical evidence, we articulate a promising, three-phase 
approach to Edge organization: one that acknowledges the emergent nature of this organizational form, and 
that offers potential to help such form to grow and flourish. Much additional research is needed—
theoretical and empirical alike—of course, but we have an actionable approach now: one that needs to be 
undertaken, explored, learned from, and refined. 
Conclusion 
Self-organization and self-synchronization represent key capabilities for Edge organizations. However, 
roughly a century of organizations research indicates that self-organization leads often to a lack of 
complementary action, or even chaos, and that coherent self-synchronization is extremely difficult to 
achieve in organizations of the scale and complexity envisioned for Edge operations. Indeed, a major role 
of hierarchical organization—the antithesis of Edge—is to enable effective organization and coherent 
synchronization of people’s activities. However, the majority of research and thinking reflects teleological 
action in a rational-cognitive framework, in which actors plan and decide before acting. This is 
incommensurate with the kinds of fluid, rapid, dynamic and often-unpredictable mission-environmental 
contexts envisioned for Edge organizations.  
 
In contrast, the research described in this paper takes a non-teleological, situated-action 
perspective to develop a basis for self-organization and –synchronization in an Edge organizational context. 
Such contrasting perspective examines how agents respond to emergent problems and contingencies 
without the benefit of clear goals or planning, and assumes that organizational members must act often 
without full awareness of consequences or articulation of purposes. Through extensive literature review 
(e.g., including pragmatic philosophy, phenomenological philosophy and practice theory), we show how a 
teleological view of action constrains the dynamics of improvisation, which are critical for self-
organization and –synchronization, and how the corresponding identity construction delimits action and 
improvisational repertoires. We explain why a shift toward self-organization and –synchronization at the 
Edge requires a non-teleological view of action, and corresponding approaches to organizational design and 
transformation: such shift marks fundamental identity change.  
 
The article leverages this theoretical understanding to illustrate how a Hierarchy organization can 
“move” to develop into an Edge. In particular, we articulate a set of maxims stemming from the theoretical 
integration. To re-iterate, the three maxims (and corresponding implications) include: Maxim 1. The doing, 
learning and on-the-job experience required to develop edge-like behaviors must take place in an 
environment that encourages and reinforces such edge-like behaviors (it is infeasible to create an Edge 
organization from within a Hierarchy); Maxim 2. The Edge organization must be grown from the 
activities, dialogs and interactions of people working together in an environment that encourages and 
reinforces edge-like behaviors (an Edge organization can be grown only through conditions that 
promote edge-like behaviors); and Maxim 3. The people working together in an environment that 
encourages and reinforces edge-like behaviors must be suited well for the kinds of activities, dialogs and 
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interactions required for Edge organization (an Edge organization can be grown only by people who 
identify with edge-like behaviors). 
 
Drawing in part from the diagnosis of organizational misfits and development of a transformation 
approach to address the GWOT challenge (see Nissen 2005b), we then outline a three-phase approach to 
creating an Edge organization—an approach that enables its emergence, and supports its growth into an 
effective operational resource. To re-iterate, we proceed through the three phases 1) Novice development, 2) 
Expertise development and 3) Transplantation. This discussion answers the three, critical and practical 
questions that are prerequisite to Edge organization: 1) which people? 2) which conditions? and 3) which 
activities? It further provides the leader or manager with an actionable plan to growing an Edge 
organization. This leads to important implications and guidelines for C2 policy and practice. 
 
This leads to opportunities for continued research on Edge organizations as well, particularly 
research focused on creating and growing such organizations. Notice that our use of terms such as creating 
and growing avoids any reference to the ubiquitous and deleterious term transformation that echoes 
hollowly throughout the Military and Government. We know well from Organization Studies, for instance 
research on organizational fields and population ecology (see Scott 2003), that oftentimes the best way to 
“transform” an organization is to create or allow to be created a completely different form that “competes” 
with it. Hence, we do not advocate attempting to transform any, current, hierarchical organization into an 
Edge. Rather, we advocate creating—and growing—one or more, alternate, edge-like organizations, and 
seeing—patiently—how well they perform. For the missions where such Edge organizations perform 
relatively better—over time—than conventional organizations do, the Edges can become responsible 
completely for these missions. Where the opposite result obtains, the Hierarchies can remain responsible. 
Where the results are mixed, both organizational forms can continue to co-exist and compete. 
 
Clearly computational experimentation using tools such as POWER (e.g., Gateau et al. 2007) will 
continue to play a key role in research along these lines. It is very time-consuming and expensive to grow 
an Edge organization in the field, but it is very quick and cheap to model and simulate one via computer. 
Additionally, laboratory experimentation using tools such as ELICIT (e.g., Leweling and Nissen 2007) will 
play an important role also. Although more time-consuming and expensive than computational 
experiments, laboratory experimentation involves the participation of real people, and can be designed 
often to exhibit excellent external validity and generalizability through very realistic tasks and task 
environments. Laboratory experiments remain much quicker and cheaper also than growing Edge 
organizations in the field. 
 
However, the major advances will come via fieldwork and experimentation with physical 
organizations. Some leaders and policy makers will need to authorize and commit to the creation and 
growth of at least one Edge organization, and some researchers will need to study it in the field, to learn 
about such organization as it emerges and grows, and to communicate such learning to leaders and policy 
makers as well as to other researchers. However, this paradigm suggests that communication of non-
contextual guidelines and rules are limited in helping to develop competence in operating in edge-like 
situations to novices only.  DoD leaders must acknowledge that competence and expertise do not require 
the kind of conscious knowledge that is often attributed. A non-teleological approach to action suggests 
that knowledge is not a matter of internal representation, but rather involves embodied skills.  Therefore, 
leaders are encouraged to design learning situations that involve trial and error, experimentation, concerned 
active involvement. Clearly this constitutes a campaign of experimentation, one that will likely require 
many years to complete. But given the nature of the “long war” on global terror—and the limited gains of 
conventional, hierarchical, military organizations to date—there appears to be ample time to pursue this 
parallel approach to addressing the GWOT. As within the Edge organization itself, the pursuit of parallel 
approaches represents a fundamental approach to efficacy. By enabling a parallel Edge approach, little will 
be lost, yet the long war itself stands to be won through greater agility and learning—and hence 
performance and efficacy. 
 
Moving from bureaucracy to edge involves a change in identity, a move from a sense of identity as 
manager / leader to influencer or facilitator. There is a strong relationship between sense of identity, sense 
of competence, and what cues a person is likely to notice.  Managers will tend to notice and feel drawn to 
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respond to cues that are familiar and ones around which they have developed skills  In command and 
control organizations managers are most likely to see change within organizations as infrequent, 
discontinuous, and intentional. They are more likely to construe organizational activity as goal-seeking, 
motivated by disequilibrium and disruptions, needing outside interventions. In terms of identity, they are 
more likely to see themselves as prime movers focusing on inertia that needs to be disrupted, searching for 
leverage points for intervention. These managers are more likely to articulate alternate schemas and 
visions, notice and interpret revolutionary triggers, seek to build commitment to vision, see their primary 
task as planning and controlling.  
 
Within edge-like settings, managers are more likely to see change as emergent and self-
organizing, constant and cumulative. As facilitators they are more likely to seek ways to redirect action 
already underway; more likely to notice cyclical processes without clear end states, construe change efforts 
as equilibrium-seeking. In terms of identity, edge managers are more likely to see themselves as 
choreographers who redirect change already underway, sense makers who seek to make tacit dynamics 
salient, reframe current patterns.  These managers are more likely to believe that change can be made at the 
margin, seek to alter meaning by introducing novel language, attempt to enrich dialogue, translate threads 
of conversations between disparate groups, facilitate improvisation, see their primary task as learning and 
facilitating. They are more likely to pay attention to earliest attempts to initiate actions because actors test 
out and revise “ends in view.”  
 
What impact will these various identities have on which triggers and cues they are likely to notice 
and how are they likely to respond if they see themselves as facilitators of ongoing change rather than 
intentional leaders of infrequent and episodic change? A situated action perspective helps us notice these 
dynamics.  Since things pre-reflectively “show up” in certain ways depending on how one’s skill-set shapes 
perception (what Merleu Ponty calls “creative receptivity”), this would imply that events will show up 
differently depending on identity-construal. Managers of edge organizations will elicit embodied 
solicitations to act within network centric situations. One skill that needs to be developed in edge 
organizations involves paying attention to fleeting circumstances of action that we routinely ignore. This 
challenges any notion that developing edge like competence is an acontextual skill.  The situated action 
view does not assume that everyone needs to have the same interpretation of events or meaning of actions 
in order to coordinate activity, don’t need to share collective representation of joint actions in order to 
engage coordinated activity; don’t even need the same interpretations of the symbol: boundary objects, for 
example.  
 
Since we learn skills not from reflection, but from embodied attempts, experiments, one challenge 
in edge organizations will be to encourage and unblock improvisation so that agents can attempt novel 
actions without full awareness of their purposes.  One skill that edge managers will need to foster is the 
capacity to span boundaries, to notice connections between the familiar and unfamiliar.  Managers will 
learn to appreciate dialogical view of action. Albert and Hayes emphasize the importance of access to 
information. However, this implies that what is needed is not just access to information, but also access to 
conversation and dialogic exchange. Without the benefit of frame-challenging conversations, non 
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